Punishment as a mechanism to maintain bilateral cooperation: A social behavior experiment

Authors
Keywords:
bilateral cooperation, third-party punishment, second-party punishment, real estate expropriation, compensation
Abstract

We designed 3 social behavior experiments involving compensation for real estate expropriation. We recruited 88 students at a university in China as our participants, and investigated the impact of third-party punishment on bilateral cooperation in a laboratory setting. The results showed the heterogeneity of human behavior in the different experiment types. In addition, results showed that the potential impact of punishment became more powerful by adding a third party. Finally, a third party had low punishment costs and a significantly higher probability of actually imposing punishment than did a second party. Results showed that, compared with second-party punishment, third-party punishment is more conducive to the maintenance of bilateral cooperation.

Author Biographies
  1. Yuling Liao, Central South University and Hunan University of Finance and Economics
    School of Business, and Department of Legal and Public Administration
  2. Kairong Hong, Central South University
    School of Business
  3. Liang Zhang, Central South University
    School of Business
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Published
2014-08-12
Section
Articles
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Social Behavior and Personality maintains an open editorial policy and may or may not endorse the conclusions made in its published articles. Neither the journal nor its publisher, editors or staff assume any responsibility for any material considered to be offensive or defamatory, or for obtaining any copyright permissions necessary for publication of articles.